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History and Perspective 
In order to increase efficiency, measure productivity, decrease risk, and generally 
maximize profits, many private enterprises monitor their employees. While “workplace 
surveillance,” a term used interchangeably with “employee monitoring” (Ball, 2010, p. 
88) is an age-old practice, its contemporary methods in the United States have their roots 
in the transformation of the workforce in the mid-19th to early 21st centuries.  When 
laborers began moving to cities to sell their time for wages, the focus of work and the 
workplace shifted from subsistence labor on farms to hourly and salaried work in the 
factories of the industrial revolution. Business in the United States turned into “big 
business;” at the end of the 19th century, as the railroads expanded their organizational 
reach, merchants with localized shops and market knowledge had to merge in order to 
remain competitive in a growing market. The mergers did not produce uniform 
organizational units automatically, and the modes of production and accounting within 
the combined company were often in disarray (Saval, 2014, p. 38). Once the production 
of goods and the methods of their transit exceeded the slower, human pace of labor, a 
control crisis emerged for employers who suddenly needed to process much more 
information to keep up with the industrial pace of production (Beniger, 1989, p. 169). 
The pressing question became: what structures and technologies can ensure efficiency 
and integrity in the organization of business and labor (Zureik, 2003, p. 48)? The 
innovations in information processing and communication technologies that developed 
to address this question were mainly directed at managing workers (Beniger, 1989, p. 
169).  
Although the philosopher Adam Smith had theorized about this subject in England 
in the 18th century, the actionable answer to this question in the United States came from 
Frederick Winslow Taylor, a measurement-obsessed mechanical engineer who worked 
as an efficiency consultant to businesses at the turn of the 20th century (Saval, 2014, p. 
45). His mission, emerging alongside Fordism, was to map out the knowledge of how a 
task was done by identifying, fragmenting and regimenting workflows and to deploy 
methods of “performance monitoring” to reach production targets (Sewell, 2005, p. 691). 
The worker’s knowledge of and control over the work is thus removed from the worker 
and its execution is rationalized into discrete piecework that is organized and overseen 
by the manager in an increasingly scientific process (Braverman, 1998, p. 80-82). 
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The rule of the Taylorist system is that the unobserved worker is an inefficient one 
(Saval, 2014, p. 42).  Monitoring is meant to prevent workers from slowing or sabotaging 
the modes of production, both in factories and in offices. In Taylor’s day, some 
managers tried to achieve willing compliance by making time-tracking into a game, 
using a stopwatch to foster friendly competition amongst workers (Saval, 2014, p. 42); 
contemporary managers continue to use a variety of methods, like reward systems, to 
encourage their employees to comply with workplace monitoring.  
Offices, which were expanding from the typically close-knit spaces that bosses 
shared intimately with their aspiring and upwardly-mobile clerks, welcomed the 
Modern Efficiency Desk in 1915. The Desk was invented as a counter-point to the 
Wooton, which was “a grandiose desk with numerous cubbyholes for papers, and 
foldout wings, and truly a home for the clerk and his papers.” By contrast, the flat, metal 
Efficiency Desks installed in long rows “gave clerks and their papers nowhere to hide” 
(Saval, 2014, p. 42). Author Nikil Saval (2014) describes how, as merchants’ offices grew 
into corporate structures, white-collar office work devolved into positions perceived as 
less prestigious in American society. He notes that in 1920, there were 3 million clerical 
workers in America, compared to 80,000 in 1870 (p. 74), and the specialties amongst 
them had grown exponentially. The trend became for bosses to separate from the spaces 
they had previously shared with their clerks in favor of occupying segregated offices, 
and departments were invented as organizational units to house clerks according to 
their discrete functions. Eventually, the departments would be sub-divided into cubicle 
workspaces (p. 60). Employee monitoring and management grew with the changing 
technologies and workspace designs that increasingly removed autonomy, discretion, 
and prestige from workers and allotted it to a managing elite. 
Modern day managerial supervision has become palpably easier as new 
technologies have enabled more varied, pervasive and widespread monitoring practices 
that include routine drug-testing and the monitoring of email (Sewell, 2005, p. 700).  
Moreover, the boundaries of what constitutes a workplace are becoming increasingly 
porous, especially as digital devices and technologies mediate much of our work content 
and communications both remotely and on a job site. Electronic monitoring can occur 
directly at work or as a function of employees’ accessibility to employers through their 
devices beyond the office. Subsequently, the boundaries of workplace surveillance are 
being negotiated in the context of a larger debate between what is public and what is 
private (Dash, 2014).  
For many sociologists, the power dynamics of social control, particularly in the 
organization of workplace surveillance, harken back to Michel Foucault’s interpretation 
of an idea that Jeremy Bentham had for the strategic, spatial placement of 19th century 
prison guards. In Bentham’s model, guards were positioned in a way that minimized 
who could see them, but maximized their view of the prisoners, in a panoptic design 
that aimed to govern prisoners’ behavior by the coercive uncertainty of being seen 
(Lyon, 2008, p. 57). Although Bentham’s design was seldom implemented in prison 
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architectures, the panoptic principle is frequently applied to interpretations of 
technologies that have surveillance capacities. Zuboff (1988) describes, for instance, how 
the ‘heightened visibility’ provided by surveillance cameras in a retail shop that signal a 
mechanism of control can, to the business manager, capture ‘objective facts’ to discover 
where an operational deficiency is (p. 86). The cameras can also act as safeguards against 
shoplifting, track customer movements for analytics purposes, monitor employee 
behavior, and identify an area in the store that needs to be tidied up (Harris, 2014). The 
rhetoric of safety often plays into the reasons listed for surveillance technologies, 
although safekeeping is seldom their sole purpose or effect.  
Just as the watchers experience surveillance with a variety of intentions, 
understandings, and purposes, those who are subjected to monitoring express a range of 
reactions to surveillance, including passive compliance and active resistance. While 
many psychologists and organizational behavioral consultants see monitoring 
technologies as neutral, their measurements signal recognition that while these tools are 
used to achieve organizational goals, they can also negatively impact employees (Ball, 
2010, p. 88). 
Power and Purpose 
The application of new surveillance technologies in the workplace affects power 
relations with different outcomes (Zureik, 2003), and the effects of surveillance in 
general are not homogenous (Yar, 2003). Similarly, workplace surveillance technologies 
can act to ‘anticipate conformity’ or to normalize discipline, but not everyone sees a 
panoptic machine when they pass by a closed-circuit television (CCTV) camera (Yar, 
2003). Monitoring is often accepted or perceived as one method by which employers 
communicate to employees which tasks they value protocol for, and where employees 
are ill advised to be creative (Ball, 2010, p. 93). However, the effects of surveillance may 
not fit with the goals an institution has set out to achieve via their monitoring methods 
(Lyon, 2008, p. 86). For example, British police installed CCTV cameras into the area 
where the “Yorkshire Ripper” murders of prostitutes occurred in the 1970s and ‘80s, 
hoping to scare prostitutes from their place of work (Sewell, 2014). Instead, prostitutes 
gathered in front of the cameras so that their departures from the street and into a 
vehicle would be time-stamped, and the license number or other details of the driver 
would be recorded in case anything bad happened to them.  
Surveillance technologies can be used in many ways to create a sense of security for 
workers, and the public. “Sousveillance” is the term that describes how those who are 
typically watched by a more dominant power from above can turn the surveillance gaze 
on their overseer from below. For example, some workers have used their smartphones 
to record abusive behavior by their employers in performance evaluations (Koeppel, 
2011). Video-recording technologies became fixtures of public life starting in the late 
1960s, when CCTV cameras were installed in public places as a tool for law enforcement. 
Widespread adoption of video surveillance tools in businesses like banks and 
 
Data &Society Research Institute datasociety.net
restaurants rose in the late 1990s, when these tools became cheaper and as data storage 
technologies improved (Roberts, 2012).  
Not only do law enforcement agents turn to surveillance cameras to investigate 
criminal activity as a record of evidence; the public increasingly demands access to 
surveillance tapes to question the actions of police. After Michael Brown was killed by a 
police officer in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014, public outcries demanded access to both 
public and private surveillance records. Some police departments around the country 
are adopting body-cameras for its agents to have a record of events. The existence of 
surveillance footage collected by law enforcement agents who are wearing body-
cameras is not always readily available to the public, though. For example, the San 
Diego Police Department asserts that any footage captured by the cameras their agents 
wear on-duty is not part of the public record once that footage becomes part of an 
investigation; they will routinely refuse requests to release recorded data (Libby, 2014).  
It is not always clear who owns recorded data, and ownership issues can affect the 
power dynamics of work-related surveillance in ways that cut across all socio-economic 
classes.  For example, a woman wearing Google Glass, which has recording capacities, 
was attacked in a bar in San Francisco (SF) recently by patrons who objected to 
perceived invasions to their privacy, and because the expensive Glass device symbolizes 
tech workers who form a privileged elite in a city rife with tensions between high-
income tech workers and low-paid service workers (Resnikoff, 2014). However, low-
paid retail workers could start wearing Glass, too. Emotient, a facial recognition 
company, was testing out an app earlier in early 2014 for Glass that could help retail 
workers gauge how successful their promotional campaigns are with customers by 
analyzing signals like their facial expressions (Truong, 2014). The data gathered by a 
Glass app may is generally owned by third-parties, rather than the owner of a Glass 
device, who mine the information it collects to a variety of purposes (Resnikoff, 2014). 
Even when surveillance technologies are more even distributed across socio-economic 
classes, their effects do not necessarily reflect evenly distributed gains from the 
technology. In fact, if lower-income workers are broadly equipped with devices that can 
be used for surveillance, they may serve to normalize the public’s exposure to 
technologies that people might be more weary of if they reflected the power of a 
privileged class. And yet, the divide between who has a device, as opposed to who has 
the data, reflects an important and widening disparity in the ownership of information 
that can impact issues of control in the workplace.  
Employers have a strong incentive to maintain control and order of their 
workplaces, and surveillance is often used to achieve this goal. CCTV cameras are 
usually visible in the workplace (although Nanny cams are a prominent exception), as a 
signal to workers (and sometimes customers) that they are being watched so that they 
behave accordingly. Much like cameras were intended to communicate surveillance to 
Yorkshire’s prostitutes by recording the details of their location and activities, cameras 
are a warning that a record of bad behavior is available to the cameras’ operators.  
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Time and activity tracking technologies today often function to root out the 
inefficiency now known as “time theft,” which employees are especially warned against 
as part of their job training in food service, warehouse, retail, and cleaning industries 
(Ehrenreich, 2001, p. 29). “Time theft” can be punishable by law; for example, fudged 
time sheets can lead to felony charges like grand larceny and falsifying business records, 
even for temporary clerical workers (Staffing Industry Analysts, 2014). Employees have 
also used the principles and legal thrust of time theft to seek legal remedies from their 
bosses when they have been made victims of “wage theft.” Examples of this are when 
employees are made to work after they clock out, or in instances when their supervisors 
shave time from their time cards, resulting in stolen wages. Wal-Mart has been held 
liable for millions in wage theft (Staffing Industry Analysts, 2014), and McDonald’s 
workers recently filed seven class-action suits in New York, California, and Michigan for 
similar wage theft violations (Fox, 2014). In those cases, the monitoring of time and tasks 
serve to empower the workers to hold their employers accountable for misconduct, but 
they also speak to how embedded the notions of workplace surveillance and track-
ability are in how labor and employment relations are negotiated on a legal scale, as well 
as at a managerial level.  
In this digital era, businesses use electronic monitoring primarily to root out 
productivity losses that stem from Internet misuse, to protect trade secrets from being 
communicated, and to prevent legal liability for their employees’ activities (Smith, n.d.). 
Furthermore, because of the ease of doing so, digital surveillance is seen as an acceptable 
practice for disciplinary and general, pro-efficiency purposes. The service sector is the 
most exacting in terms of minute-level surveillance, but the Internet is credited with 
amplifying monitoring across the board. According to scholar Kirstie Ball (2010), 75% of 
US companies monitor employee communications and their activities on the job. 
Although the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 makes the interception 
and monitoring of electronic communications unlawful, this does not apply when those 
communications pertain to business, particularly when said communications are on 
company-owned devices (Beesley, 2012). A 2007 survey of 294 US companies by the 
American Management Association and the ePolicy Institute found that of those with 
1000 or more employees, over a third employed people to read their employees’ 
outgoing mail, and of these about three-quarters used electronic tools to automatically 
monitor email (American Management Association, 2008). Additionally, the survey 
found that 66% of employers monitored their employees’ Internet activity, and nearly 
half of the employers tracked content, keystrokes, and time spent at the computer.  
Workplace monitoring technologies and programs have also developed in ways 
that are more visible than key-logging and less ominous-seeming than CCTV cameras. 
For instance, several high-profile employers, like BP America, have adopted Fitbit, a 
fitness-tracking device, for some of their employees in a bid to improve employee health 
habits while simultaneously persuading insurance companies successfully to reduce 
their rates, at significant savings to the company (Bort, 2014). While employees can 
technically opt in or opt out of a company health and wellness program, without the 
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furtive actions required to duck out of view of surveillance cameras, the employees who 
willingly comply with it may be perceived as higher-value to their employees. 
Moreover, employees who opt-out can suffer real financial costs. The pharmacy 
company, CVS, is currently being sued by an employee for its health-screening program, 
which allegedly requires employees to disclose items like weight and level of sexual 
activity (Burman & Stuart, 2014). Employees who opt out of the screening program, but 
still want to use the company’s health plan pay $600 more per year than employees who 
comply with the screening (Burman & Stuart, 2014). Additionally, even in wellness 
programs that rely on reward incentives rather than punitive measures to achieve 
compliance, it might be tough for an employee to object to a health-monitoring program 
when they will be seen as more risky for their employers than those who do comply. 
Furthermore, without being able to measure the direct harms of surveillance, it’s hard to 
account for the privacy costs to employees of employers tracking their fitness and health 
information.  
Not all health and wellness programs necessarily ask for information that seems 
invasive to employees’ privacy; moreover, even though an employer is sponsoring the 
program, it does not mean that they have access to the information that’s collected, or 
can use it to any purpose. Some employees bring information about their disabilities to 
the HR departments of their employers in order to discuss how they can be 
accommodated in the workplace. There is an implicit and often explicit understanding 
that the information they use to negotiate accommodations for their disabilities in the 
workplace will not affect their job security. Legally, disability information cannot be 
used to make hiring or promotion decisions about job candidates or employees, but 
employees may fear that their performance evaluations will be affected by the sensitive 
information that they share in ways that can mask discrimination. Generally, sensitive 
information that is gathered or revealed, and which is not necessarily protected by civil 
rights legislation, may make employees feel more vulnerable to surveillance in the 
workplace. Policies that help to govern how new forms of information gathering and 
sharing act to empower or disempower stakeholders can help balance the benefits of 
monitoring with the implicit threat it can introduce into the workplace.  
Technology and Control 
Direct and active electronic monitoring can create rigid technological control over 
standardized work activities, but the oppressiveness of this rigidity can also elicit forms 
of resistance. For example, stockers in an Amazon warehouse have their movements 
tracked as they load and unload products from docks, and their minutes and distance 
are catalogued as they crisscross the lengths of the warehouse (McClelland, 2012). All 
this is part of Amazon’s efforts to study and produce the most efficient methods for 
completing tasks, but the bottom line for the workers is that they will be fired if they 
don’t hustle (Head, 2014). Another popular method of active, detailed tracking is 
prevalent in call centers, which typically use an Automatic Call Dialing System (ACD) 
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that can feed, time, and record calls, as well as track administrative work between calls 
(Lankshear et al., 2001, p. 598). It can also keep logs of sign-ins and sign-outs to the 
system. In addition to an ACD system, employers surveil employees by accessing their 
calls or call recordings remotely to evaluate agents and their interactions (Lankshear et 
al., 2001, p. 598). Calls can be fed to the caller every 3-4 minutes without breaks, and 
customer interaction is scripted to reduce opportunities for work avoidance 
(Mulholland, 2004, p. 709). However, callers use a variety of methods to regain control, 
such as talking to an answering machine and recording the interaction as a sale 
(Mulholland, 2004, p. 709).  
More passive monitoring, where the emphasis on control is not as tangible, may 
operate differently on a worker whose activities are recorded, but not actively tracked, 
as a sort of remote or distant threat to act in compliance with the expectations of their 
workplace. The data collected by passive monitoring of employees is generally used to 
pinpoint what went wrong in the aftermath of some incident that hindered the efficiency 
of an operation (Mulholland, 2004, p. 709). However, passive monitoring technologies 
can also blur lines between efficiency-oriented and toxic or demoralizing workplace 
surveillance. For example, a surveillance product called SureView allows employers to 
log every keystroke employees make, track their emails, and browsing histories in an 
effort to discover instances when employees may have some malicious intent (Shahani, 
2014). If an employee has a file that they put onto a USB stick, the program will reveal 
the contents of that file to the employer in real-time so that they can identify if that file 
reveals company secrets, on the suspicion of ill-intent, rather than an operational 
deficiency (Shahani, 2014). 
Recruitment, Surveillance, and Care 
The types of surveillance exerted from the workplace also function to create 
opportunities for inclusion and exclusion, both in the recruiting stages of employment 
and in advancement or movement of employment after hiring. At a basic level, having 
the right kinds of identification (social security number; government-issued photo ID) 
(Goffman, 2014, p. 40) and, at a more advanced level, being willing to submit to drug 
testing, personality testing, or Facebook monitoring can strongly impact or outright 
determine entry into the workforce. Some of these acts of surveillance occur only as a 
singular event or as a series of random ones, while techniques like call monitoring or 
key-logging are typically ongoing.  
The so-called human element of worker monitoring was introduced by a strong 
adherent to Taylorism, the psychologist and engineer Lillian Gilbreth, who developed 
personality and psychological testing for personnel management (now Human 
Resources) in the 1930s that has become a central tenet of modern management theory 
(Saval, 2014, p. 56). Not only would workplaces, like offices, be designed so that workers 
would internalize their boss’ gaze, but the addition of these testing methods signaled 
that the boss was genuinely trying to get inside employees’ heads (Saval, 2014, p. 61). 
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Functionally, personality testing affects a certain participatory acquiescence by workers 
who consent to be monitored because it normalizes monitoring as a condition for entry 
or promotion in the workforce, at least for large employers. A 2011 survey by the Society 
for Human Resource Management found that only 18% of employers use personality 
tests, mostly for mid-level managers (56%), executives (45%), and entry-level exempt 
jobs (43%), although they found that 71% of HR professionals think personality tests are 
useful (Society for Human Resource Management, 2011). The potential of monitoring 
technologies to infer sensitive information from the material that is monitored, like 
references to personal events, can create tensions or acts of resistance to “mission creep” 
or “function creep” (Ball, 2010, p. 92), and can even violate the law. For instance, 
employers are prohibited from testing for or soliciting information on employees that 
would indicate they are susceptible to mental illness (Dattner, 2013). Workplace 
personality testing has come under scrutiny for inadvertently or purposefully 
discriminating against job candidates with mental health issues by screening out 
candidates who answer affirmatively to statements like, “Over the course of the day, I 
can experience many mood changes” (Weber & Dwoskin, 2014). 
Recruitment procedures, particularly in the service industry, routinely require job 
applicants to undergo criminal history background checks and drug tests. The latter can 
occur perennially, although most drugs leave the body’s system within a few days, so 
these are jokingly referred to as “intelligence tests” that examine who fails to outwit 
them, according to Ball (2010, p. 91). More problematically, urinalysis intended for drug 
screens can also potentially reveal information about some medical conditions that a 
person may have, albeit with a higher false-positive rate than a blood test would incur, 
such as certain nephritic conditions, uncontrolled diabetes (MedicineNet, 2014), and 
pregnancy, along with other sensitive information (Information and Privacy 
Commissioner/Ontario, 1992, p. 8). Employees have to trust that the inferred or 
available health information will not be used against them, or to a purpose beyond the 
stated intent of their employers or the test. As the ACLU (2002) reports, “[i]n 1988, the 
Washington, D.C. Police Department admitted it used urine samples collected for drug 
tests to screen female employees for pregnancy - without their knowledge or consent.” 
Although there is no evidence to suggest that employers are using urinalysis drug tests 
to screen employees for medical conditions on a broad scale, workers may have cause to 
be concerned if their employability rests on keeping their sensitive medical information 
private. The possibility that a form of surveillance will capture more extensive 
information can create a stratification of vested privacy interests. While some workers 
might object to surveillance because it conflicts with their sense of cultural autonomy, 
others might fear that sensitive information about them could directly harm their 
prospects for promotion. 
There have been incidents that highlight how drug-testing in the workplace can be 
subject to abuses of its intended or stated purpose. For example, in Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Medical University of South 
Carolina’s use of urinalysis to detect drug use in pregnant employees violated the 
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employees’ Fourth Amendment rights1 to be free from unreasonable searches because 
the University fed positive results of drug use to police (Weiner, Reichman & 
Cummings, 2001). The employees who refused to attend a drug rehabilitation program 
were promptly arrested (Weiner et al., 2001). Clearly, the degree of control or coercion 
that employers can assert over employees through monitoring is limited in some ways, 
but it can be difficult to draw a line in the sand because of the varied interests that 
different stakeholders have in the practice of surveillance. The Hospital, and the State, 
might have a valid vested interest in preventing drug use in their pregnant employees, 
and may be justified in conducting drug tests or suggesting rehabilitation programs; the 
line between acceptable and unacceptable enforcement methods was crossed when 
police were summoned to arrest employees who were not compliant with the Hospital’s 
intervention.  
Policies in the workplace that demand intrusive inspection of employees, 
particularly of their private lives and their health, can raise the specter of hawkish 
oversight, and can lead to employee resistance. For example, research conducted on an 
Irish call center revealed that employees are obliged to go through a back-to-work 
interview every time they take one day of sick leave (Mulholland, 2004, p. 719). If an 
employee stays away for three non-consecutive sick days, the illness is monitored, and 
physician’s notes may be required. More problematically, employees who are only sick 
for one are two days are not compensated; they only receive sick day pay if they are out 
for more than three days. New hires are not granted sick days until they’ve been with 
the company for six months. Employees resistant to these leave policies and this 
particular type of bio-surveillance would sometimes stay away for more than three days 
instead of one, exacerbating absenteeism in response to managerial controls perceived as 
punitive or insulting (Mulholland, 2004).  
Like most surveillance technologies, the practices of employee monitoring are 
inflected with narratives of safety, but they also often stem from an earnest desire to 
improve workplace management. For every tale of workers’ resistance to paternalistic 
devices that monitor their performance, there is an additional story of a junior employee 
who is rendered suddenly visible to upper management because monitoring 
technologies identify him as a vital node in a social network that helps hold the 
organization together (Smith, 2014). Surveillance is usually multi-purposed and comes 
with a range of opportunities and disadvantages, which is why it is challenging to either 
support or reject it wholesale. For instance, the monitoring technologies that highlight 
which employees are more important to how a workplace functions can also be used by 
employers to identify incidents of employee theft (Lohr, 2014). An employee who objects 
to the notion that they are being viewed as a potential thief by their employer may 
                                                      
1 “The Court held that this procedure was in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the state 
interest (i.e., providing treatment for drug-abusing pregnant women) was inseparable from the 
law enforcement function. The fact that the police used the information to arrest and prosecute 
women violated the special needs doctrine.” (Weiner, Reichman & Cummings, 2001) 
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accept and look forward to the possibility that their hard work will be rendered visible 
to upper management.   
New monitoring technologies often track relational data (rather than attribute data, 
like gender or age) about who talks to whom. Sociometric Solutions, which has clients 
that include the Bank of America and Cubist Pharmaceuticals, uses sensors placed on 
employee identification badges to track who is talking to whom, for how long, with 
what tone of voice, how quickly they speak or when they interrupt, etc. to try to identify 
what makes for a good team and what does not; in one instance, they discovered that the 
most important interactions between salespeople outside their teams happened at the 
coffee machine (Brustein, 2013). The company does make some allowances for privacy 
concerns by withholding individualized data from the companies that use their services 
(Brustein, 2013), but these workplace improvement efforts still trigger concerns about 
loss of agency and control.  
Privacy concerns are particularly salient because certain employers have been 
permitted by law to hold the private-life actions of their employees accountable to the 
standards of their workplace. For example, a teacher was forced to resign for modeling 
work she did in a bikini, which the school considered sexually explicit and in breach of 
their standards (Huffington Post, 2013). In response to the blurred line between private 
and public life, especially in digital spaces, the Electronic Frontier Foundation published 
guidelines for bloggers on how to remain anonymous on the Internet so that their 
employers don’t catch them writing criticism that can be construed as disloyal, and 
which could lead to termination (Ball, 2010, p. 92). Increasingly, connectivity, 
identifiability, and surveillability are inherent to what social spaces and communication 
technologies are becoming, whether they are for work, study, hobbies, or combined use.  
Case Study: Truck Drivers 
Governmental authorities usually see workplace surveillance in terms of keeping 
the public and workers safe, but as researcher Karen Levy (2014, personal 
communication) observes, the rhetoric and methods of safe-keeping can also serve as 
scaffolding for employers to expand beyond the safety mandate into more intrusive 
monitoring practices. For example, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 
which regulates trucks and truck drivers, is making efforts to integrate electronic 
monitoring devices into trucks as a way of enforcing its time limits on how long a driver 
can be on-duty, which are designed to prohibit accidents that result from fatigue (Levy, 
forthcoming). If companies will be forced to install electronic on-board recorders 
(EOBRs), the cost of implementing that mechanism alongside others that serve the 
employer’s organizational aims, like devices that capture information on a driver’s fuel 
efficiency, idling time, or instances where the driver goes off the pre-determined route, 
is reduced (Levy, forthcoming). Still, while a variety of EOBRs are already used in the 
trucking industry, they are a cause of concern for truckers who cite occupational 
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autonomy and privacy as points of contention; for instance, they may object to having 
their location tracked when they are off-duty in their trucks or on their way home.  
Resistance to monitoring in general is complicated by the fact that some degree of 
monitoring is acceptable to most workers, and can effect or normalize compliance, such 
that the legitimacy of resistance depends partly on the legitimacy of the monitor and the 
technology used (Ball, 2010, p. 89). According to Levy’s (2014) research, truck drivers 
pride themselves culturally on their autonomy on the open road and away from 
managerial oversight in close working quarter. They engage in an array of surveillance-
evasion tactics, from falsifying paper logbooks to destroying EOBRs with rubber mallets, 
or hacking them to play solitaire. However, resisting control is not just about cultural 
cowboyism or regaining control over time; it is also borne of deep economic necessity, 
and exemplifies how resistance itself can be participatory in a form of worker 
exploitation. Truck drivers are usually paid by the mile; if they resist EOBRs, it’s not 
necessarily because they object to the notion of putting boundaries on their working 
hours or scoff at the notion of driver fatigue: the limitations enforced by EOBRs would 
make it impossible for them to earn a living for themselves and their families under the 
current pay structures and regulatory requirements. Thus, they often feel forced into 
self-exploitation in order to survive. 
In some circumstances, employers may be complicit in undermining governmental 
attempts to monitor workers because they have contradictory economic motives for 
monitoring them (Levy, 2014, p. 7). For example, Levy observed a dispatcher advising a 
truck driver to “roll” for several miles, driving below the speed threshold that would 
activate the EOBR. The dispatcher suggested this because the driver was approaching 
his 14-hour daily, legally mandated on-duty limit (Ibid., p. 16). While the employer has a 
vested interest in safeguarding drivers from accidents that are the result of overworking, 
they also need freight to arrive at its destination on time.  
Surveillance practices come with many overlapping layers of logic – what is 
reasonable from a business, governmental, or employee perspective - that help 
determine which monitoring practices are acceptable, or what modes of engagement 
with them are appropriate. These practices are wrapped up in a technology that enables 
ever-increasing forms of monitoring to stretch our current frameworks for 
understanding labor relations. 
Contemporary Shifts: The Knowledge Economy and Re-Skilling Workers 
The shift from an agriculture and manufacturing-dominated society to a so-called 
“knowledge economy” is producing new conceptions of what monitoring controls are 
necessary to achieve productivity. How can employers assert control over the 
indeterminate nature of a worker’s knowledge? This concern is rooted in the changing 
nature of employment, as workers shift to a model where they compete to have 
employers purchase their services by being relevant and up-to-date on innovations and 
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developments in their fields —a departure from a system where their supervisors forced 
them to maximize their labor outputs by reducing the cognitive aspects of their work 
(Sewell, 2005, p. 693). The old Taylorist move to de-skill work activities and to relieve 
the cognitive demand that traditional work places on employees is being supplanted in 
management theory by the recognition that all work places cognitive demands on 
employees, and that giving employees room for discretion helps to co-opt their 
knowledge to increase operational efficiency. Sometimes this comes in the form of literal 
rooms in physical office workplaces or unregulated social spaces (Sewell, 2005) or ‘zones 
of privacy’ (Bernstein, 2012, p. 1) that are allocated for workers to gather in without their 
bosses around. As sociologist Arne Kalleberg (2013) notes, there is a large body of 
literature that discusses how worker autonomy is a major factor in what makes a good 
job distinct from a bad one. Sometimes the absence of surveillance can be just as 
rewarding as a system that uses employee monitoring to identify and reward workers 
based on how that system scores their performance.  
In a factory in China that manufactures mobile phones, researchers from the 
Harvard Business School (Kalleberg, 2013) recently experimented with surveillance by 
sectioning off some workers from broader view with curtains, and found that they were 
10-15% more productive than their un-curtained colleagues, in part because they were 
more willing to share tips when they had some measure of privacy (Lohr, 2014). Explicit 
methods of overt surveillance are potentially becoming less relevant to productivity, 
whereas explicit efforts to achieve privacy in a heavily surveilled workplace can have 
real benefits by giving workers a sense of control and autonomy in their environments. 
In other words, if de-skilling workers in the Taylorist management model leads to 
resistance by workers who do not enjoy participating in automated efficiency systems, 
humanizing their workplaces with space for privacy and discretion can encourage good 
workers to give their labor and knowledge more willingly.  
There is a trend in workplace management, particularly in the area of digital labor, 
geared towards projects, or contained task-oriented results that can be outsourced to 
independent and flexible workers whose collaboration is supported by ubiquitous 
technologies and infrastructures (Boyer, 2014). The transactional cost of monitoring 
traditional employees shifts to the independent worker, who has to self-monitor to 
deliver their part of a given project (Neff, 2012. p. 18). This shift in the labor market and 
in the workplace environs is partially a function of employment policies stemming from 
the mergers and layoffs that characterized the 1980s, which forced people out of a 
permanent workforce and into contract-based temp or perma-temp positions (Saval, 
2014, p. 293) that continue to characterize “at will” employment culture.   
Work that is unrestricted by time or place offers opportunities for remote control by 
“soft surveillance” (Saval, 2014 ,p. 297), which indicates that the digital revolution may 
be just as significant as the industrial revolution in its impact on employee monitoring. 
The soft monitoring power exerted by Internet-connected devices that mediate 
communications between employers and workers elicits a sort of “coerced 
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volunteerism” (Marx, 2005) from workers, so that they respond to or comply with work 
expectations or demands off the clock out of performance anxiety and a desire to appear 
professional (Gregg, 2011, p. 145). This is distinct from the involuntary compliance 
associated with “hard surveillance,” like requiring job candidates to take mandatory 
drug tests or to supply their Social Security Number.  
Ubiquitous technologies like smartphones, laptops, and general Internet 
accessibility enables employees to carry their workplace devices in transit and into the 
domicile, and for the private actions of their networked selves to reverberate back to 
their workplaces. In retail, the practices of haphazardly scheduling part-time employees 
to perform full-time hours without having to classify them as full-time, and thus be able 
to deny them the associate benefits, is well documented (Center for Law and Social 
Policy, Retail Action Project, and Women Employed, 2014, p. 3), but the practice is 
enabled in part by the technology that allows workers to be accessible on-demand. In a 
book that explores how new technologies, like smartphones, tablets and laptops, enable 
and support a tendency for professionals to bring their work home with them, the socio-
cultural theorist Melissa Gregg (2011) relays the tension this creates as the line between 
the workplace and the domicile is blurred: "Should I answer that email tonight after my 
last glass of wine? Do I have to be friends with my colleagues on Facebook? Will my son 
know if I'm listening to him from the other room as I finish this overdue presentation? 
Does my boss even know when I am at work?" (p. 6).  
The existence of a technology that both mediates employment opportunities and 
acts as a tracking monitor can create greater accountability of employers towards their 
contractors—and to the public. This became evident recently after a driver for Uber, the 
cab-on-demand transportation network, who is legally classified as a contractor (not an 
employee), has flexible work hours, and works from a privately-owned vehicle, hit and 
killed a child. Uber initially denied responsibility for the driver because there was no 
passenger in the car, an argument that implied that the driver was off-duty (Welch, 
2014). After the family of the child sued, Uber expanded its driver insurance to cover 
drivers who are logged into the app and available to accept a ride, even if there is no 
Uber passenger inside. The tool that tracks and monitors the movements and timing of 
contracted drivers formalized a connection between the Uber platform and its 
contractors created larger accountability and responsibility for the more powerful party, 
and eliminated the gray areas surrounding driver service terms (if he or she is on or off-
duty) in an unwittingly positive example of “mission creep” (Rosenblat & Stark, 2014). 
The contractor who is logged-in is, in this sense, more secure than the worker who feels 
insecure because she doesn’t know if her boss knows that she is working, or whether her 
son suspects her of working at home. In some cases, the absence of direct surveillance or 
supervision can be freeing for the worker. In other cases, a worker can assert greater 
control over their employer by pointing to surveillance as proof of mutual interest and 
responsibility. However, Uber’s instantiation of employer-labor relations is significant 
because it signifies that the protections we associate historically with unionized labor are 
absent from contract labor. The protections that do emerge are arriving haphazardly as a 
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function of incidents like the above example, rather than because there has been an 
intentional restructuring of labor protections that match the current labor market. 
Surveillance is implicated in these dynamics because it tethers employees to employers 
and creates new terms for work, both in positive and negative ways.  
Contract workers strive to maintain their employability, for they know they lack 
employment security. Sometimes this is a choice and comes from a preference for 
flexibility, but more often it is because the indeterminacy of labor is a structural 
condition of the workplace. As a result of trends in the workforce that emphasize 
flexible and contract labor, the monitored and quantified worker is giving way to the 
reflexive monitoring self who manages their own efficiencies and their own brand and 
reputation (Lupton, 2014). Flexible, post-industrial workers have to be both 
entrepreneurial and inherently exploitable (Nguyen, 2014). In other words, independent 
workers are absorbing more of the costs of doing business and do so with less security, 
thus providing a twist on the notion that surveillance is itself the source of security. Just 
as truckers who resist surveillance to maintain their autonomy effectively exploit their 
own labor to support a system that wouldn’t pay them enough in wages if they followed 
the rules to sustain themselves and their families, those who work at gigs as contractors 
or micropreneurs in the peer economy swallow the costs of being self-employed, 
without the sizeable financial rewards and social capital we associate with successful 
entrepreneurship. Is self-monitoring in a floating workplace a more or less desirable 
form of surveillance than employee monitoring in its more traditional forms?  
The dynamics of control that workplace surveillance enacts on employers and 
employees theoretically perform a safe-keeping function as well, guarding employees 
and employers alike from time-theft, for instance, although employees are generally 
much more vulnerable to exploitation than employers are because they have less social 
and monetary capital to assert remedies against large employers who abuse time sheets. 
By contrast, a temporary or long-term contractor working at gigs has to swallow the 
costs involved with self-employment, including the time spent seeking out work or 
getting to gigs and the transport costs, like gas and insurance, but this freedom from 
direct oversight comes with a price (Singer, 2014). This price invites us to consider the 
broader costs or values of surveillance and what it implies for labor protections, as well 
as what the absence of surveillance signifies. Does it communicate a belief in a worker’s 
competence, or a lack of care for their safety and protection? How do we measure the 
safety that a monitoring system offers to its stakeholders? Evidently, the line between 
workplace surveillance as coercive and protective/performance-enhancing is in constant 
tension in labor relations, especially as work shifts beyond a specific, bounded location 
and spills over into a multiplicity of spaces and sites that are neither entirely private nor 
explicitly the purview of employers. These changing conditions of the workplace invite 
us to consider which forms of workplace surveillance are beneficial, disadvantageous, or 
necessary to sustainable labor and efficient processes, and what the effects of monitoring 
are on workers in a range of workplaces.   
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Conclusion 
 
The literature on surveillance offers a lot of descriptive explanations about 
workplace monitoring, but there is a dearth of specific metrics for understanding how it 
changes over time. There remains a gut feeling that monitoring is invasive or sinister, 
but the debate about it happens at a descriptive level, rather than at a level that can 
account for temporal change. Part of this has to do with the proliferation of new 
technologies that make monitoring more efficient and less expensive. However, while 
the literature on sociology and surveillance studies credits this reduction in costs with 
the rise of surveillance technologies, there is a dearth of specific information about what 
these costs are; how they change over time; and what the material value of alternatives 
to direct surveillance are.  
There is an unchallenged assumption that employers monitor their employees 
simply because they can, and that they do so more intrusively for the same reason—
especially as technologies evolve to enable more and more methods of surveillance. But, 
would it be valuable to measure these shifts and evolutions? As it stands, the literature 
indicates that there isn’t a point of mutual consent amongst all parties involved; instead, 
there is a mutual understanding or complicity in acknowledging what is happening as 
the boundaries of what is possible stretch uncomfortably into the blurry terrain of what 
is permissible and what is considered a violation. What are the privacy concerns that 
workers have about the surveillance data that is collected on them? How could it 
influence their future job prospects? Numerous other questions emerge as well: to what 
degree are these new tools exacerbating a power differential between employers and 
laborers? What constitutes “labor” and what divides it from home life? When labor is no 
longer bounded by the spatial constraints of a physical location, what are the new 
frameworks we have to consider when thinking about labor and its protections? And, 
what should we be measuring to understand what is happening? These questions 
represent significant gaps in the literature on workplace surveillance that merit attention 
and thoughtful consideration.  
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